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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20040816-CA
v.
REY DE LA CRUZ LOPEZ,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The State appeals from the trial court's sua sponte order withdrawing defendant's
guilty pleas to two counts of forgery, a third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Once the trial court announced sentence, did the court lose jurisdiction
to withdraw defendant's guilty pleas, where the plea withdrawal
statute provides that any request to withdraw a plea "shall be made by
motion before sentence is announced"?
Whether the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law

reviewed for correctness. Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, If 8, 31 P.3d 1147.
Similarly, the interpretation of a statute presents a question of law reviewed for
correctness. State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ^f 31, 52 P.3d 1210, cert denied, 537 U.S. 1172
(2003).

Preservation: The State preserved this claim by arguing, during the hearing on the
trial court's sua sponte motion, "that there's [no] mechanism at this stage for the
defendant" to withdraw his plea (R. 103:5). Even if the State's argument did not preserve
this claim, "[objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter may be
urged at any stage of the proceedings, and the right to make such an objection is never
waived." James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah App. 1998) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
II.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sua sponte withdrawing
defendant's guilty pleas, where nothing in the record demonstrates that
defendant's pleas were unknowing or involuntary?
A trial court's grant or denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for

abuse of discretion. See State v. Lehi, 2003 UT App 212, \ 7, 73 P.3d 985. However,
whether the trial court applied the appropriate rule of law in reaching that decision is
reviewed for correctness. Cf State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ^ 24, 55 P.3d 573.
Preservation: This issue was preserved by the State's objections during the
hearing on the trial court's motion (R. 103:3, 7).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutory provision is attached at Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2003).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
In April 1999, defendant presented an invalid social security number and a
counterfeit residency card in order to secure a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) guaranteed loan on a home (R. 102:7).
On March 19, 2004, defendant was charged with one count of forgery, a third
degree felony, and one count of communications fraud, a second degree felony, or in the
alternative, one count of theft by deception, also a second degree felony (R. 1-6).
On August 19, 2004, defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State in
which the State agreed to amend the communications fraud count to a count of forgery
and defendant agreed to plead guilty to two counts of forgery (R. 43-50; R. 102:2). The
trial court then conducted a plea colloquy with defendant through an interpreter. During
the colloquy, defendant confirmed that he understood the rights he was waiving by
entering his pleas, the charges and penalties involved in the pleas, and the factual basis
for the pleas (R. 102:4-7). Defendant also confirmed that, although the Statement of
Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel was in English, not
Spanish, his attorney had "[gone] through [the document] carefully with [him]" (R.
102:7-8). The trial court accepted defendant's pleas (R. 102:4-9).
Defendant asked to be sentenced immediately (R. 102:9). His counsel explained,
"[We'd] ask the Court to sentence him today, and I think that the State joins with me in
this, basically just to turn the case over or not give him any more time, release him to the
immigration customs enforcement officials for deportation to Mexico" (R. 102:10).
3

Before announcing sentence, the trial court addressed defendant directly: "If you
are sentenced today then you are giving up the right to file a request to withdraw this
guilty plea. Did you discuss that with [counsel]?" (R. 102:11). Defendant responded,
"Yes," and then confirmed that he wanted to be sentenced immediately (R. 102:11). The
court further inquired, "You understand, sir, that if you are released to INS, then you are
prohibited from coming back to this country if they deport you without their permission?"
(R. 102:11). Defendant again responded, "Yes" (R. 102:11).
The trial court then sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of zero-to-five
years at the Utah State Prison, stayed imposition of those terms, placed defendant on
probation, and authorized his release to the INS (R. 102:12). After also ordering
restitution, the court announced, "We'll be in recess" (R. 102:13).
In a minute entry entered the same day, the trial court noted, "Based upon
information brought to the Court, the court sets aside defendant's plea in this matter. Plea
is stayed pending a hearing in this matter" (R. 51-53).
On August 23, 2004, the trial court held a hearing on the matter (R. 103). When
the prosecutor indicated, "Your Honor, I'm not entirely sure what the current status is. I
just got a call Friday saying show up today," the court responded:
The current status is is [sic] that on Friday the record will
indicate that Mr. Rey de la Cruz Lopez entered a plea to two third
degree felonies, forgery charges. It's been brought to the Court's
attention—in fact, we discussed this at the time that the plea form
itself was in English and not in Spanish. Mr. de la Cruz is not fluent
in English. This form was translated for him, but based upon
information the Court received, I have serious concerns that Mr.
4

Lopez understands the ramifications of what he is doing and what a
plea to these charges means to him.
(R. 103:2). Specifically, the court was concerned that "the plea here will eliminate the
fact that he will be able to spend any time with his family for the rest of his life" (R.
103:3). Thus, the court determined, "it might be appropriate for the Court to set aside his
plea in this case and allow this matter to proceed" (R. 103:2-3).
The State objected to the court's sua sponte motion, arguing that "it's the State's
position that defendant did know what he was doing based upon [defense counsel's]
representation and the Court's colloquy with the defendant," and that "[e]verybody knew,
including the defendant, that the plea meant he would be deported" (R. 103:3). The State
also questioned whether such deportation meant that defendant would not be able to see
his family where he could either attempt to seek legal re-entry into the country or his
family could visit him in Mexico (R. 103:3).
Defense counsel confirmed that he had reviewed the plea agreement with
defendant (R. 103:4). However, counsel differed from the State concerning whether
defendant would ever be allowed to re-enter the country after his pleas (R. 103:4). Thus,
although defendant "isn't sure what he wants to do in terms of allowing the Court to
withdraw his guilty plea," counsel concluded that, "given the Court's concerns, it may be
wise to have that reviewed by the defendant. I want to make sure that he understands the
consequences" (R. 103:4, 6).

5

The State again objected "to reopening" defendant's pleas (R. 103:7). The trial
court acknowledged the State's objections but ruled:
I believe that based upon everything that has been brought to the
Court's attention that Mr. Lopez was not fully informed in
understanding—and had full understanding of the consequences of
his act here, and I'm going to set aside his plea.
(R. 103:7).
The State filed a notice of appeal on September 21, 2004 (R. 69-70). The trial
court entered a final order setting aside defendant's pleas on October 6, 2004 (R. 84-85).
The State filed an amended notice of appeal on October 19, 2004 (R. 86-87).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under the former statute governing withdrawal of guilty pleas, Utah's appellate
courts held that a court lacks jurisdiction to consider motions to withdraw filed outside of
the statutory thirty-day period. In 2003, the Legislature redefined the statutory period to
expire upon announcement of sentence. Applying the prior law to the current statute, the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider its sua sponte motion to withdraw because it was
made after sentence had already been announced.
Alternatively, the trial court abused its discretion in setting aside defendant's pleas
because the court based its decision on concern that defendant may not have recognized
all the collateral effects of his pleas. Under established case law, a defendant's lack of
knowledge of the collateral consequences of a plea does not render that plea unknowing
or involuntary. In any case, the record demonstrates that defendant was aware of those

6

collateral consequences when he entered his pleas. Finally, to the extent the court's
decision rests upon non-record evidence, it is error.
ARGUMENT
L

WHERE THE PLEA WITHDRAWAL STATUTE PROVIDES THAT
MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW MUST BE MADE BEFORE
ANNOUNCEMENT OF SENTENCE, THE TRIAL COURT LACKED
JURISDICTION TO WITHDRAW DEFENDANT'S PLEAS ONCE
SENTENCE WAS ANNOUNCED
Under the statute governing withdrawal of pleas (the "plea withdrawal statute"),

the trial court lacked jurisdiction to set aside defendant's pleas once it announced
sentences on those pleas. Thus, this Court should vacate the trial court's order setting
aside defendant's pleas.
Before May 5, 2003, the plea withdrawal statute provided that "[a] request to
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest... shall be made within 30 days after the entry of
the plea." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1999). In 1992, this Court held that the 30day time limit in the statute was jurisdictional. See State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 583
(Utah App. 1992), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, f 11, 31
P.3d 528. The supreme court reached the same conclusion one year later. See State v.
Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993) (per curiam) (holding that once thirty-day
statutory period expires, "the right [to move to withdraw a plea] is extinguished"). Thus,
under the former statute, "[i]f a defendant [was] informed of the statute's thirty-day
deadline for filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, section 77-13-6(2)(b) [was]
jurisdictional." Price, 837 P.2d at 583; see also State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,ffif3-4, 40
7

P.3d 630; Ostler, 2001 UT 68, «|ffl 10-11 & n.3; State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222,126, 95
P.3d 1203; State v. Afe/o, 2001 UT App 392,14, 40 P.3d 646; State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000
UT App 186,110, 5 P.3d 1222, abrogated on other grounds by State v. iteyey, 2002 UT
13,ffij3-4, 40 P.3d 630; State v. Canfield, 917 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah App. 1996).
Effective May 2003, the Legislature amended the plea withdrawal statute to
provide that "[a] request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest... shall be made by
motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be announced unless the motion
is denied." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (2003).
Having passed this amendment against the backdrop of Price, Abeyta, Reyes, and
Ostler, the Legislature's clear intent was to redefine the jurisdictional period in which a
trial court may consider a motion to withdraw. See Horton v. Royal Order of the Sun, 821
P.2d 1167, 1169 (Utah 1991) (noting "legislature is presumed aware of legal context in
which it acts") (citing Hackfordv. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 1284-85
(Utah 1987)); State v. Hatch, 342 P.2d 1103, 1105 (Utah 1959) ("The Legislature is
presumed to know the construction placed upon the language of the act. .. ")}
]

The Senate floor debates concerning the amendment are consistent with that
intent. As Senator Gladwell explained in presenting the bill on the floor:
The plain language of the statute currently states that [defendant's]
must withdraw the plea within 30 days after the entry of the plea. It
takes about six weeks from the time a person enters a plea until they
are sentenced, so the statute has always anticipated that a person
would enter a plea knowingly and voluntarily and then the plea
would take effect prior to sentencing so that he couldn't withdraw it
unless there was some showing of lack of voluntariness or that he
didn't enter it knowingly. And of course, that's challenged from
8

Thus, if the defendant is given proper notice, the trial court's jurisdiction to
withdraw a guilty plea now expires upon announcement of sentence. See State v.
Helbach, 2004 UT App 388, \ 7 (Oct. 28, 2004) (per curiam) (unpublished) (holding
"trial court had no jurisdiction" to consider motion to withdraw filed after sentence was
announced where statute "limits a defendant's right to withdraw a guilty plea to the time
before the announcement of sentence") (attached at Addendum B); see also State v.
Peterson, 2004 UT App 4 5 6 , \ 4 (Dec. 2, 2004) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("The effect
of section 77-13-6 is to grant a limited opportunity to withdraw a plea. If a motion to
withdraw is not filed within the specified time frame, '[thereafter, the right is
extinguished.'") (quoting Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995) (attached at Addendum B).
In this case, defendant entered his guilty pleas on August 19, 2004, and asked to be
sentenced immediately (R. 102:4-10). The trial court asked, "If you are sentenced today
then you are giving up the right to file a request to withdraw this guilty plea. Did you
discuss that with [counsel]?" (R. 102:11). Defendant responded, "Yes" (R. 102:11). The
trial court then announced defendant's sentences, after which the court stated, "We'll be
in recess" (R. 102:13).
time to time. The supreme court in 2001 decided that the plain
reading of the statute didn't make sense so they decided that what the
statute really meant is that they had 30 days after entry of the
sentence to withdraw the plea. The purpose of this bill, one of the
purposes, is to clarify that a plea must be withdrawn before
sentencing is announced, to kind of reinstate that earlier language.
Tape 2 of Utah Senate Floor Debates, 56th Legislative, General Session (March 4, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Gladwell discussing H.B. 238).
9

At that point, under section 77-13-6, as amended, the trial court lost jurisdiction to
consider any motion to withdraw defendant's pleas. See Helbach, 2004 UT App 388,17;
see also Reyes, 2002 UT 13,fflf3-4; Ostler, 2001 UT 68,ffi[10-11 & n.3; Abeyta, 852
P.2d at 995; Smit, 2004 UT App 222, % 26; Afe/o, 2001 UT App 392, ^ 4; Tarnawiecki,
2000 UT App 186,110; Canfield, 917 P.2d at 562; Price, 837 P.2d at 583.
Consequently, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant its subsequent sua sponte
motion to set aside defendant's pleas. This Court should therefore vacate the trial court's
order and instruct the court to enter a final judgment consistent with defendant's pleas
and the sentences announced thereon.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SUA SPONTE
WITHDRAWING DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEAS WHERE
NOTHING IN THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT
DEFENDANT'S PLEAS WERE UNKNOWING OR INVOLUNTARY
The trial court erred in granting its sua sponte motion to withdraw defendant's

guilty pleas because nothing in the record established, as required by statute, that
defendant's pleas were unknowing or involuntary.
Section 77-13-6(2)(a) of the Utah Code provides that "[a] plea of guilty .. . may be
withdrawn only upon . . . a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (2003).
A trial court's grant or denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. See State v. Lehi, 2003 UT App 212, ^f 7, 73 P.3d 985. However,
whether the trial court applied the appropriate rale of law is reviewed for correctness.
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State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, f 24, 55 P.3d 573. Moreover, an abuse of discretion
occurs if the court's ruling is "based purely on 'unsupported generalizations and
speculation.'" In re Cruchelow, 926 P.2d 833, 835 & n.4 (Utah 1996).
A.

A defendant's ignorance of the collateral consequences of his
pleas does not render those pleas unknowing or involuntary.

Under authoritative Utah precedent, lack of knowledge about collateral
consequences of a guilty plea, including those related to deportation, does not render that
guilty plea unknowing or involuntary. Therefore, the trial court erred in setting aside
defendant's pleas based on concerns that defendant may not have understood the
deportation-related consequences of his pleas.
In State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Utah App. 1994), cert denied, 892
P.2d 13 (Utah 1995), the defendant claimed that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to withdraw his plea. Specifically, McFadden "argue[d] that his guilty plea was
not entered voluntarily or knowingly since he did not know of the possibility that he
might be deported . . . . " Id.
In rejecting McFadden's claim, this Court first noted that '"[ajctual knowledge of
the collateral consequences of a guilty plea is not a prerequisite to the entry of a knowing
and intelligent plea

'" Id (quoting United States v. Campbell 778 F.2d 764, 768 (11th

Cir. 1965)).
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This Court then noted that "[f]ederal courts have uniformly held that deportation is
a collateral consequence of conviction and that the possibility of being deported does not
affect the voluntariness of a guilty plea." Id.
This Court was "persuaded by these federal authorities" and thus held, "as a matter
of constitutional law, that the voluntariness of a plea is unaffected by collateral
consequences such as possible deportation." Id. at 1305 & n.2; see also State v. RojasMartinez, 2003 UT App 203, % 7, 73 P.3d 967 ("[A]n attorney's failure to inform a client
of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, without more, does not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness" where "deportation is a 'collateral consequence' of
conviction") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert, granted, 80 P.3d 152
(Utah 2003); El-Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 537
U.S. 1024 (2002); United States v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511, 517 (9th Cir.), cert,
denied, 535 U.S. 1070 (2002); United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27-28 (1st Cir.
2000); United States v. Osiemi, 980 F.2d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Montoya, 891 F.2d 1273, 1292-93 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Romero-Vilca, 850
F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 767 (11th Cir.
1985); United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 39 (D.C. 1982); Michel v. United States, 507
F.2d 461, 464-66 (2d Cir. 1974); Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst, 475 F.2d 1364, 1366
(4th Cir. 1973); State v. Nguyen, 916 P.2d 689, 698 (Hawaii 1996); Commonwealth v.
Hason, 545 N.E.2d 52, 54 (Mass. App. 1989); People v. Ford, 657 N.E.2d 265, 268 (N.Y.
1995); State v. Jimenez, 987 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Cf. Broomes v.
12

Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251, 1257 n. 4 (10th Cir.2004); Kandielv. United States, 964 F.2d
794, 796 (8th Cir. 1992).
The plea withdrawal statute and McFadden control the State's claim here. Under
the plea withdrawal statute, a plea may only be withdrawn upon a showing that it was not
knowing or voluntary. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a). Under McFadden, a
defendant's lack of knowledge about the collateral consequences of his plea, including
deportation-related consequences, does not render a plea unknowing or involuntary. See
McFadden, 884 P.2d at 1304. Thus, lack of knowledge about the deportation-related
consequences of a plea does not support withdrawal of that plea. See Utah Code Ann. §
77-13-6(2)(a); McFadden, 884 P.2d at 1304. Consequently, the trial court erred in setting
aside defendant's pleas based on its concern that defendant did not understand those
deportation-related consequences here.
B.

Even if ignorance of collateral consequences did establish an
unknowing and involuntary plea, the record shows that
defendant was aware of those consequences in this case.

Even if ignorance of the deportation consequences of a plea could render a plea
unknowing or involuntary, the trial court erred in withdrawing defendant's pleas because
the record indicates that defendant was aware of those consequences here.
As previously stated, the plea withdrawal statute provides that "[a] plea of guilty
.. . may be withdrawn only upon . . . a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily
made." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a); see also State v. Humphrey, 2003 UT App 333,
110, 79 P.3d 960 (holding, under prior statute requiring showing of good cause before
13

plea could be withdrawn, that "[a] defendant can show good cause by putting forth
evidence that the plea was in fact involuntary") (emphasis added).
In this case, the trial court set aside defendant's pleas based on "serious concerns
that Mr. Lopez [misunderstands the ramifications of what he is doing and what a plea to
those charges means to him" (R. 103:2). Specifically, the court was concerned that,
because the plea agreement was written in English, not Spanish, defendant may not have
understood that "the plea here will eliminate the fact that he will be able to spend any time
with his family for the rest of his life" (R. 103:2-3).
However, nothing in the record supports the trial court's concern that defendant did
not understand the plea agreement. Rather, as the State argued during the trial court's
hearing, the record establishes just the opposite. (See R. 102:7-8 (defendant confirming at
plea hearing—at which defendant had the assistance of an interpreter—that, although the
Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel was in
English, not Spanish, his attorney had "[gone] through [the document] carefully with
[him]"); R. 102:8 (defendant confirming at plea hearing that he had "[no] questions about
what [he was] told by the interpreter about what that document says"); R. 102:8 (State
noting that defense counsel "did take a fairly significant amount of time making sure his
client did seem to understand the form"); R. 103:4 (defense counsel confirming "I did
review the plea form with [defendant]"); R. 103:6 (second defense counsel stating "[w]e
haven't got into the aspect as to whether or not he completely understood the guilty plea
form")).
14

Moreover, neither the trial court nor defense counsel presented any evidence
establishing or even suggesting that defendant would not be able to see his family again
(R. 103:passim). Even assuming, as defense counsel did, that defendant's pleas would
make it impossible for him to re-enter this country legally, the State noted without
contradiction that, even if defendant were deported, nothing in defendant's pleas would
stop his family from traveling to see him (See R. 103:3).
Finally, even assuming that defendant's pleas would make it impossible for him to
re-enter this country legally, neither the trial court nor defense counsel presented any
evidence establishing that defendant was unaware of that consequence when he entered his
pleas (R. 103:passim). The only evidence on that issue was the record of the plea hearing,
which established that defendant was in fact aware of that possible consequence (See R.
102:11 (court confirming that defendant understood "that if you are released to INS, then
you are prohibited from coming back to this country if they deport you without their
permission"). Thus, as the prosecutor argued in opposition to the trial court's sua sponte
withdrawal motion, "[everybody knew, including the defendant, that the plea meant that
he would be deported" (R. 103:3).
In sum, the trial court's withdrawal of defendant's pleas was not based on record
evidence. Rather, it was based on unidentified information "brought to the Court's
attention," which was itself contradicted by the record (See R. 51-53 (court referring in
minute entry after announcement of sentence to "information brought to the Court"); R.
103:2 (court stating that "[i]t's been brought to the Court's attention" without indicating by
15

whom or how)) Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2 )(a) ( "A plea of guilty

. . . may be

withdrawn only upon .. . a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.")
(emphasis added).
As such, the trial court's order constituted an abuse of discretion. See In re
Cruchelow, 926 P.2d at 835 & n.4 (holding trial court abused its discretion where ruling
was "based purely on 'unsupported generalizations and speculation""). Thus, this Court
should vacate the trial court's order and instruct the court to enter a final judgment on
defendant's pleas and the sentences announced thereon.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to vacate the trial court's order
setting aside defendant's guilty pleas and to order the trial court to enter a final judgment
consistent with those pleas and the sentences announced by the court immediately after
their entry.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 2P_ January 2005.

MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK-)
Assistant Attorney General
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Addenda

Addendum A

77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea.
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea
held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced.
Sentence may not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea
held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30
days of pleading guilty or no contest.
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period
specified in Subsection (2)(c) shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a,
Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Addendum B

Not Reported in P.3d
2004 WL 2404373 (Utah App.)5 2004 UT App 388
(Cite as: 2004 WL 2404373 (Utah App.))
UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
RULES BEFORE CITING.

CHECK

COURT

Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Aaron L. HELBACH, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20040671-CA.

Page 1

In March 2004, Helbach filed a motion for
resentencing in the trial court in his criminal case.
Helbach asserted that he was incompetent at the
time of his plea, and thus the plea was invalid. The
trial court denied the motion on its merits, finding
there was no indication that Helbach was not fully
capable of entering a knowing and voluntary plea,
and that the mental evaluation from the State did
not indicate any disorder that would impact his
competency. The trial court also noted the motion
was filed several months after sentencing, but did
"not address [the] timeliness of the Motion."
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Mark L. Shurtleff and Laura B. Dupaix, Salt Lake
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Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and ORME.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
PER CURIAM:
*1 Aaron Helbach appeals the trial court's denial of
his motion to be resentenced. This is before the
court on the State's motion for summary disposition
based on lack of jurisdiction.
Helbach pleaded guilty to a charge of aggravated
robbery in August 2003. Helbach completed a
statement in support of his guilty plea, giving the
factual basis for his plea and waiving specific
rights, including his right to appeal. The document
also specified that he could withdraw his plea only
on good cause shown, and that he must file a motion
to withdraw his plea before the announcement of
sentence. Helbach was sentenced in September
2003.

Helbach asserts that his motion was filed "under
the philosophy" of State v. Rees, 2003 UT App 4,
63 P.3d 120, cert, granted, 73 P.3d 946 (Utah 2003)
, which permitted a defendant to file a motion for
resentencing in the sentencing court under particular
circumstances. Helbach has apparently seized on
Rees to avoid going through the procedures for
post-conviction relief as set forth in the Utah
Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Act), Utah Code
sections 78-35a-101 to -304 (2002), and Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 65C. However, after Rees, this
court has held that requests to be resentenced to
permit a renewal of an opportunity to appeal fall
squarely within rule 65C and the Act. See State v.
Manning, 2004 UT App 87,f 21, 89 P.3d 196,
cert granted, 2004 Utah LEXIS 172(Utah Aug. 11,
2004).
Additionally, Helbach has not shown that he comes
within the scope of Rees. In Rees, this court held
that extraordinary relief may be available in the
sentencing court if a defendant has been denied the
effective assistance of counsel on appeal. See Rees,
2003 UT App 4 at TJ 6. Such relief, however, is
available only in "limited circumstances, to modify
or vacate a judgment where extra-record facts show
that the defendant has been deprived of his
constitutional right to a fair trial or meaningful
appeal." Id. at U 13. Helbach waived his right to a
trial and appeal by pleading guilty and does not
come within the narrow scope of Rees.
Instead, Helbach's motion is governed by Utah
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Code section 77-13-6, providing for the methods of
challenging a guilty plea. Section 77-13-6 provides
that a guilty plea "may be withdrawn only upon
leave of the court and a showing that it was not
knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. §
77-13-6(2)(a) (2003). A request to withdraw a plea
"shall be made by motion before sentence is
announced." Id. § 77-13-6(2)(b). If a defendant
does not timely request to withdraw his plea, any
challenge to the plea must be made pursuant to rule
65C and the Act. See id. § 77-13-6(2)(c).
*2 Helbach's motion requested resentencing, but
attacked the validity of his plea, arguing he was
incompetent. The trial court addressed the merits,
finding that Helbach was not incompetent at his
plea. The trial court also noted, but did not rule on,
the late filing of the motion. In substance, Helbach's
motion was a motion to withdraw his plea, and the
trial court considered it as such. However, under
section 77-13-6, the trial court had no jurisdiction to
consider the motion because it was made months
after sentence was announced. Section 77-13-6
limits a defendant's right to withdraw a guilty plea
to the time before the announcement of sentence.
See id. § 77-13-6(2)(b). "Thereafter, the right is
extinguished." State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995
(Utah 1993) (holding that failure to file a timely
motion for withdrawal extinguishes the right). The
timely filing of a notice to withdraw a plea is
jurisdictional. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,ffl[
3-4, 40 P .3d 630.
The trial court lacked jurisdiction over Helbach's
motion, and thus this court likewise lacks
jurisdiction over this appeal. See State v. Montoya,
825 P.2d 676, 678-79 (Utah Ct.App.1991).
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.
2004 WL 2404373 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 388
END OF DOCUMENT
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Peterson's plea, or as a post-conviction petition
pursuant to rule 65C. The specific basis for the trial
court's dismissal is unclear. It appears from the
record, however, that Peterson's petition was
procedurally barred whether construed as a
post-conviction petition or as a motion to withdraw
a plea.
Pursuant to the version of Utah Code section
77-13-6 in effect at the time of Peterson's plea, a
motion to withdraw a plea must be made within
thirty days after the entry of the plea. See Utah
Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1994). The effect of
section 77-13-6 is to grant a limited opportunity to
withdraw a plea. If a motion to withdraw is not filed
within the specified time frame, "[thereafter, the
right is extinguished." State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d
993, 995 (Utah 1993). If the trial court considered
Peterson's petition as a motion to withdraw his plea,
the trial court correctly dismissed the petition as
untimely.

Before Judges BILLINGS, BENCH, and ORME.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
PER CURIAM:
*1 Joseph Peterson appeals the trial court's order
summarily dismissing his petition for coram nobis.
This is before the court on its own motion for
summary disposition.
Peterson pleaded guilty to a third degree felony
charge in 1998. His sentence was suspended and he
was put on probation. His probation terminated in
June 2003. In July 2004, Peterson filed his petition
for coram nobis alleging that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel and that his plea and
conviction should be vacated.
The petition was filed in the sentencing court under
the same criminal case number rather than as a new
case under rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The trial court could have considered
the petition substantively as a motion to withdraw

Alternatively, if the trial court considered the
petition as a post-conviction petition pursuant to the
Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Act), see Utah
Code sections 78-35a-101 to -110 (2002), and rule
65C, then Peterson's petition was also time barred.
Under the Act, a defendant must file a petition
within one year after the cause of action has
accrued. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(l). A
cause of action may accrue on "the date on which
petitioner knew or should have known, in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary
facts on which the petition is based." Id. §
78-35a-107(l)(e). Peterson filed his petition more
than one year after his case was closed and his
sentence terminated, and almost six years after his
plea. He asserts that his claim is based on facts that
were unknown to him. However, he does not
provide dates or factual support for this assertion.
Thus, Peterson has not alleged sufficient facts to
show that he has timely filed his petition.
Because Peterson's petition was untimely either as
a post-conviction petition or as a motion to
withdraw his plea, the trial court correctly dismissed
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the petition.
Accordingly, the dismissal of Peterson's petition is
affirmed.
2004 WL 2749489 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 456
END OF DOCUMENT
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